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Regime Change in the Aegean after the Second World War: 
Reconsidering the Foreign Influence
Yaprak Gürsoy
The “third wave” of democratization stimulated scholarly interest on how and to what 
extent international factors influence regime transitions.1 Past research focused on domestic 
causes of democratization and granted foreign actors only “an indirect and usually marginal 
role.”2 However,  current studies started to direct  their  attention on the impact  of Western 
actors on regime change and their policies of democracy promotion.3  Writing in 1992, one of 
the most prominent scholars of democratization, Larry Diamand, noted that “we stand at an 
extraordinary moment in history, a time of unprecedented movement to democracy.”4 The end 
of  communism  left  democracy  uncontested,  increasing  the  numbers  of  transitions  in  the 
post-1990  era.  This  trend  was  followed  by  Bush  administration’s  pledge  to  promote 
democracy and the European Union’s positive role in stabilizing democracy in several East 
European nations. As a result of these developments, the growing literature on the external 
influences  of  regime  change  has  focused  primarily  on  the  post-Cold  War  cases  of 
democratization.
However, important conclusions can be drawn by studying earlier regime transitions. 
In the Cold War era, the American government confronted a “dilemma when engaging with 
friendly dictators in its battle against communism.”5 Similarly, after the September 11 attacks, 
1 Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
2 Philippe C. Schmitter, “An Introduction to Southern European Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Italy, 
Greece, Portugal, Spain, and Turkey,” in Guillermo O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter, and Laurence Whitehead 
eds., Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Southern Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1986), 
5.
3 Jon C. Pevehouse, “Democracy from Outside-In? International Organizations and Democratization,” 
International Organization 56, 3 (Summer 2002), 515.
4 Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” Foreign Policy 87 (Summer 1992), 25.
5 David Adesnik and Michael McFaul, “Engaging Autocratic Allies to Promote Democracy,” The Washington 
Quarterly 29, 2 (Spring 2006), 9.
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the US government chose to cooperate with friendly tyrants, such as Saudi Arabia, rather than 
encouraging democratic transitions in authoritarian allies. Indeed, “democracy promotion has 
never  achieved  the  status  of  principal  foreign  policy  interest…,  official  rhetoric  to  the 
contrary notwithstanding.”6 This contradiction in the contemporary world has also led some 
states,  such  as  Russia,  Uzbekistan,  Belarus,  China,  Nepal,  Zimbabwe,  Ethiopia,  and 
Venezuela,  to  denounce  American  democracy  assistance  as  infringement  of  sovereignty.7 
Thus, American influence on democratic transitions produced mixed results after the collapse 
of  communism,  similar  to  the  Cold  War  era.  For  this  reason,  studying  earlier  cases  can 
highlight how democracy promotion works and why it sometimes fails.
This paper studies two cases of regime change after the Second World War. One case, 
Turkey, made a transition to democracy in 1950. The other case, Greece, became authoritarian 
after a military coup led by a group of colonels in 1967. This comparison is important even 
though democracy  in  Turkey saw at  least  three  military  coups since  19508 and  Greece’s 
authoritarianism collapsed in 1974. According to the conventional view held by the Greek 
sources, the United States was involved in the establishment of the 1967 Greek junta and 
helped sustain it. Similarly, the existing literature on the 1950 Turkish transition to democracy 
holds that one of the determinants of democratization was the desire to become part of the 
Western alliance. Thus, ironically, the new world order set out by the US at the end of the 
Second World War is seen as the cause of diametrically opposite regimes in two neighboring 
countries belonging to the same alliance. In Greece it is seen responsible from an authoritarian 
regime whereas in Turkey it is believed to be the cause of democracy.
6 Peter J. Schraeder, “The State of the Art in International Promoyion: Results of a Joint European-North 
American Research Network,” Democratization 10, 2 (Summer 2003), 33.
7 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs 85, 2 (March/April 2006), 
55-68.
8 However, no long term authoritarian regime was established in Turkey after 1950. Ali L. Karaosmanoglu, “The 
International Context of Democratic Transition in Turkey,” in Geoffrey Pridham ed., Encouraging Democracy:  
The International Context of Regime Transition in Southern Europe (Leicester, London: Leicester University 
Press, 1991), 160, 170.
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What was then the real effect of US foreign policy in the Greek and Turkish regimes? 
How much role did foreign factors play in the Turkish democratization and Greek military 
intervention during these the Cold War years? In this paper, I argue that even though domestic 
dynamics played crucial roles in these cases, external influences also affected the outcomes. 
External  factors changed the calculations  of the elites and the cost-benefit  analysis  of the 
domestic actors. Especially critical  in this regard was the impact of foreign factors on the 
power and role of the military in Greek and Turkish societies. 
In Greece, the end of the Second World War and German occupation brought about a 
costly Civil War between leftist and rightist forces. The right-wing Athens government and 
the  military  won  the  war  with  considerable  British  and  American  support.  American 
assistance continued after Greece became an ally of the West in the Cold War. However, the 
Hellenic Armed Forces received the bulk of this aid, strengthening the military relative to the 
rest of society. This kind of empowerment of the military decreased the costs of repression 
when the colonels staged their coup in 1967. On the other hand, the experience of the Greek 
Civil War, the Cold War context, and American indoctrination against communism gave the 
impression  to  the  colonels  that  the  leftist  forces  were  increasingly  threatening  the  Greek 
sociopolitical system. This perception that the left must be contained increased the benefits 
associated  with  intervention.  Thus,  for  the  colonels,  the  benefits  of  establishing  an 
authoritarian regime started to exceed its costs.9  
In the Turkish case, contrary to Greece, international factors facilitated the transition 
to  democracy.  By  1950,  the  benefits  of  sustaining  the  authoritarian  regime  had  already 
decreased due to a number of domestic factors, such as the repression of threatening forces by 
the  Republican  People’s  Party  (RPP),  the  moderate  nature  of  the  opposition,  and  the 
9 This type of cost-benefit analysis can be rephrased using the terminology of Robert Dahl. According to Dahl, 
the probability of polyarchy increases when the costs of repression are higher than the costs of toleration. 
Conversely, the probability of a hegemonic regime increases when the costs of toleration exceed the costs of 
suppression. It is possible to rephrase the costs of toleration as benefits of an authoritarian regime. Robert A. 
Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1971).
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persuasion  of  the  authoritarian  rulers  that  they  could  win  the  elections  in  a  competitive 
system. Rather than altering the benefits of authoritarianism, what the international dynamics 
changed in Turkey was the costs of sustaining the regime. Mobilization for the Second World 
War revealed the weaknesses of the Turkish Armed Forces. This led lower ranking officers to 
oppose the rule of the Republican People’s Party (RPP) and shift their support to the newly 
established Democratic Party. Since the power of RPP relied partly on the military, the costs 
of repressing the Democrats and sustaining the authoritarian regime increased when the armed 
forces  lost  their  cohesiveness.  At  the  same  time,  the  threat  posed  by  Turkey’s  northern 
neighbor,  Soviet  Union,  necessitated  an  alliance  with  the  Western  bloc.  The  Republican 
leaders  believed  that  it  would  be  difficult  to  convince  the  American  government  that 
authoritarian Turkey was an ally unless there was a transition to democracy. Thus, the costs of 
sustaining the single-party regime increased due to the Second World War and the Cold War 
international  context.10 Coupled  with  the  belief  that  the  benefits  of  single-party  rule  had 
diminished, the Republican elites made a transition to democracy.
International Influences on the Costs and Benefits of Military Intervention in Greece
On 21 April 1967, a group of middle ranking officers forcefully intervened in Greek 
politics and established an authoritarian regime that lasted until 1974. There is a strong belief 
among the Greeks that the 1967 intervention was staged by the United States. The claims of 
Andreas Papandreou and leftist politicians have perpetuated the notion that especially the CIA 
was  directly  involved  in  the  insurgency.11 According  to  this  argument,  the  United  States 
needed a location for its Sixth Fleet in Greece. The intervention became a necessity in order to 
10 Adopting Dahl’s arguments, Hakan Yilmaz calls this the “expected external costs of suppression.” Hakan 
Yilmaz, “External-Internal Linkages in Democratization: Developing an Open Model of Democratic Change,” 
Democratization 9, 2 (Summer 2002), 67-84.
11 Andreas Papandreou claims that the intervention originated at the Greek Central Intelligence Agency, which 
was “an administrative and financial appendage of the CIA.” Democracy at Gunpoint, Man’s Freedom (New 
York: Colombia University Press, 1970), 226.
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achieve this goal since the democratically  elected Center Union government threatened to 
severe Greece’s ties with the USA. It is clear that during these Cold War years, CIA officers 
and American embassy personnel had contact with Greek politicians, military officers, and 
even  the  colonels  before  their  intervention  (since  some  of  them  worked  at  the  Greek 
Intelligence Agency). It is quite possible that they exerted influence and their opinions were 
taken into consideration  before political  actions  that  could have an impact  on the NATO 
alliance were decided. There is also no doubt that the colonels calculated how the Americans 
would react to a military intervention. 
However, there is no evidence to suggest that the Americans initiated the authoritarian 
regime.12 Indeed,  the first  reaction of the American government  to the insurgency was to 
officially oppose it, declare the hope that there would be a return to democracy, discontinue 
sending heavy weapons, and officially suspend diplomatic relations after the King’s failed 
coup on 13 December 1967. However, these gestures were symbolic, rather than substantive, 
since at the time the USA could not afford to lose an important ally at the vicinity of the 
USSR and the Middle East. Later, even these gestures were dropped, heavy weapon supplies 
were resumed, the administration rebuilt its close ties with Greece, and the Sixth Fleet started 
operating from Greek territory. But, members of the US Congress and the Senate continued to 
be critical of the regime, and the attitudes of the administration were not always consistent. 
For instance, the suspension of heavy weapon supplies was reintroduced at the beginning of 
Nixon’s  term.  Additionally,  some  European  countries,  especially  the  Scandinavian  ones, 
demanded Greece  to  be  ousted from NATO.13 Thus,  there  was no unified  American  and 
12 There are indications that the King asked the US ambassador’s opinion on the intervention prepared by the 
military generals before the April 1967 coup. Ambassador Talbot and the administration were against a coup that 
would prevent the elections in May to take place under normal democratic procedures. Given that the Americans 
opposed a coup by the King and the generals, it is highly unlikely that they supported and aided the colonels’ 
intervention. Peter Murtagh, The Rape of Greece: The King, the Colonels, and the Resistance (London and 
Sydney: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 110, Maurice Goldbloom, “United States Policy in Post-War Greece,” 
Richard Clogg and George Yannopoulos eds. Greece under Military Rule (London: Secker & Warburg, 1972), 
238-240.
13 Christos L. Doumas, “Crisis, Revolution and Military Rule in Greece: A Tentative Analysis,” The Southern 
Quarterly 6, 3 (1968), 273-274, 287, Goldbloom, “United States Policy in Post-War Greece,” 238-254, A. G. 
Xydis, “The Military Regime’s Foreign Policy,” in Greece under Military Rule, 195-197, Adam Garfinkle, “The 
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NATO policy towards the colonels even when military aid continued and close ties were 
forged  between  the  USA and  the  Greek  colonels.  It  seems  far  fetched  to  think  that  the 
Americans controlled the colonels to the point of making them intervene in Greek democracy. 
This type of argument directs attention away from the real cause of the authoritarian regime 
and makes it more difficult to assess the true impact of American involvement. 
The  following  pages  will  attempt  to  examine  American  influence  on  Greek 
authoritarianism and how external factors interacted with domestic variables. First, the effects 
of external military assistance on the costs of intervention will be analyzed. In the second 
section,  the  influence  of  the  Cold  War  on  the  perceived  benefits  of  establishing  an 
authoritarian regime will be examined.
Civil War Legacy, Military Assistance and Costs of Intervention:
One of the main external influences on the transition to authoritarian regime in Greece 
was American military aid and training, which created strong and autonomous armed forces. 
The colonels staged a coup in April 1967 using the equipment, skills, and contingency plans 
gained  during  the  Civil  War  years  and  the  Cold  War  environment  afterwards.  Years  of 
American  and  NATO aid  kept  the  military  relatively  more  powerful  than  the  opposition 
groups. This lowered the costs of intervention for the colonels, who controlled the resources 
of the armed forces. Military aid continued after the transition to authoritarianism, this time 
helping the colonels to sustain their regime. 
During the Second World War, most of Greece’s territories were occupied by the Axis 
powers of Germany, Italy, and Bulgaria.14 The King, part of the military organization, and the 
Nadir of Greek Democracy,” in Daniel Pipes and Adam Garfinkle eds., Friendly Tyrants: An American 
Dilemma (Basingstoke: MacMillan Press Ltd., 1991), 69-73. Greece was banned from the Council of Europe in 
1969 and relations with the European Economic Community were frozen. The attitude of the Europeans towards 
the Greek regime caused the colonels to rely even more heavily on American military aid, diplomatic support, 
and economic investment. For more information on the European reactions, see Arne Treholt, “Europe and the 
Greek Dictatorship,” in Greece under Military Rule, 210-225.
14 For more information on the occupation, see Mark Mazower, Inside Hitler’s Greece: The Experience of  
Occupation, 1941-1944 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993).
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government  of  the  country  fled  to  Cairo.  In  mainland  Greece,  most  of  the  country  was 
controlled  by the newly established  resistance  organization,  the National  Liberation  Front 
(EAM), and its military arm, National Popular Liberation Army (ELAS). Both organizations 
were led by the communists.15 After  the Axis powers withdrew from Greece,  the official 
Hellenic government returned to Athens. The first conflict occurred between EAM/ELAS and 
the  government  in  December  1944  when  the  leftists  attacked  Athens,  following  mass 
demonstrations and a general strike organized by the Communist Party. The British troops 
located in Athens repulsed the communists, forcing them to sign a truce in February 1945 and 
to disband.16 However, after the agreement, the military, police, and anti-communist gangs 
continued  to  attack  the  communists.  These  assaults  were  allowed  by  the  government  in 
Athens  and  the  British.  As  repression  continued,  the  Communist  Party  reorganized  its 
activists, causing Greece to lapse into guerilla warfare and Civil War.17 In the subsequent four 
years, Greece was divided between the communists, represented by the Democratic Army of 
Greece (DSE), and the right-wing.
The Civil War concluded with right-wing victory thanks to several external factors. 
First,  the  communists  in  Greece  did  not  receive  aid  from  the  USSR  because  of  the 
Percentages Agreement of October 1944. According to this agreement between Russia and 
Britain, while Greece was left to British influence, Romania and Bulgaria was conceded to the 
USSR. Keeping its word, the Soviet Union did not provide support to the DSE. After 1949 
Yugoslav aid to the Greek rebel forces was also cut. As a result, the leftists could not find 
necessary supplies against the rightists. The right-wing government forces, on the other hand, 
were  financed  and  trained  by  Western  powers.  In  1947,  the  Truman  Doctrine  promised 
15 Hagen Fleischer, “The National Liberation Front (EAM), 1941-1947: A Reassessment,” in John O. Iatrides 
and Linda Wrigley, eds., Greece at the Crossroads: The Civil War and Its Legacy (Pennsylvania: The 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995), 48-90.
16 David H. Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War (London and New York: Longman Group Limited, 1995), 
137-145, C. M. Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece: 1941-1949, 3rd Edition (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee Publisher, 
2003), 111-139.
17 Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War, 150-184.
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military  aid  and  economic  assistance  to  Greece  along  with  Turkey.  After  this  American 
commitment, Greece came under the influence of the USA more than Britain. Thanks to this 
external help, the government forces were able to crush the communists.18 
American assistance partially took the form of civilian aid, which allowed the right-
wing  government  to  provide  welfare  benefits,  agricultural  credits,  and  increase  state 
employment opportunities. These measures improved the popularity of the right-wing relative 
to  the  leftist  forces.   Most  of  the  communist  soldiers  lacked  proper  food,  clothing,  and 
weapons.  They  terrorized  the  population  under  their  control  to  receive  supplies  and  to 
forcefully  recruit  members.  These  measures  reduced  the  popularity  of  the  DSE  while 
American aid increased the support gathered by the Athens government.19
The second type of American assistance was direct military aid and training. During 
the  Civil  War,  the  Hellenic  Armed  Forces  received  $353.6  million  worth  of  assistance, 
approximately 160,000 “small arms weapons” and 4,000 “mortar and artillery pieces” from 
the USA. 20  Foreign  aid  granted  the much needed weapons to  fight  the  war  and it  also 
provided for the expansion of the army from around 98,000 soldiers at the end of 1946 to 
120,000 officers in 1947. At the end of the Civil War, 150,000 officers served in the army 
alone, as opposed to at most 15,000 DSE forces. 21 At the beginning of the Civil War, the 
British were responsible for training the new recruits in the military. Later, the United States 
took the initiative. After October 1947, the Greek military received tactical advice on how to 
conduct the war from the joint US military advisory and planning group. Americans also sat 
in the Supreme Council of National Defense meetings.22 During these crucial years, British 
18 Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War, 189-220, Woodhouse, Struggle for Greece, 169-306, John O. 
Iatrides, “Civil War, 1945-1949: National and International Aspects,” in John O. Iatrides, ed., Greece in the 
1940s: A Nation in Crisis (England: University Press of New England, 1981), 195-219.
19 Close, The Origins of the Greek Civil War, 214.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., 200, 214-216, Thanos Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics: From Independence to Democracy  
(London: Hurst & Company, 1997), 146-147, 150.
22 Veremis, The Military in Greek Politics, 147-148. The other three institutions in which a representative of the 
American mission for aid to Greece was present were the foreign trade administration, currency committee, and 
the social insurance foundation. A. A. Fatouros, “Building Formal Structures of Penetration: The United States 
in Greece, 1947-1948,” in Greece in the 1940s, 250-253.
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and later American involvement made it possible for the right-wing to win the war, and also 
secured an assertively anti-communist  military equipped with new tactics on how to fight 
internal enemies.
After the Civil War, Greece became a secure ally of the West. In 1952, Greece became 
member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Within this framework, Greece 
started to receive arms supplies and officer training in the USA or in other NATO countries. 
The amount  of aid the armed forces obtained was disproportional  vis-à-vis  the assistance 
other  societal  groups  received.  Between  1944  and  1962,  the  military  alone  got  $1,600.5 
million worth of aid while the whole non-military aid totaled to $1,918.3 million and $224.2 
million of loans. Moreover, even though after 1956, economic assistance rapidly declined, 
“military aid… continued to flow as part of the Mutual Security Agreement under the Truman 
Doctrine and as part of NATO obligations.”23 
This type of disproportional assistance continued after the Greek colonels intervened 
in 1967. Between 1950 and 1969, a total of 11,229 military officers received training in the 
USA. Under the same military assistance program, close to 2,000 students received training in 
overseas NATO installations. Given that there were 11,000 officers in the Greek armed forces 
after the Cold War, these trainings covered a significant faction of the officers. In NATO 
schools military officers were taught not only warfare, strategy and military technology, but 
also political  science,  sociology, economics,  and psychology.24 In 1970, “there were some 
3,000 US military and Defense Department employees stationed in Greece compared to just 
210 US government  employees  who were not  attached to  America’s  military  interests.”25 
Since no other social  group received this much systematic training from a foreign power, 
23 See table 4.7 in A. F. Freris, The Greek Economy in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 
1986), 148, quote from page 149-150. According to another calculation, Greece received 1,150 million dollars of 
military aid but only 341 million dollars for other ventures between 1947 and 1957. Murtagh, The Rape of  
Greece, 40.
24 Constantine P. Danopoulos, Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece (Chapel Hill: Documentary 
Publications, 1984), 27, Doumas, “Crisis, Revolution and Military Rule in Greece,” 269, Veremis, The Military 
in Greek Politics, 155.
25 Murtlagh, The Rape of Greece, 19.
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“United  States  policies  have  contributed  to  the  hypertrophy  of  the  Greek  military 
establishment compared to the relative atrophy of political structures such as political parties, 
trade unions, and other pressure groups.”26 
In terms of arms supplies, Greece received 941 million dollars worth of weapons from 
mostly the USA, but also from France and Germany between 1964 and 1973.27 Even though 
the  USA  cut  heavy  weapon  supplies  at  first  in  order  to  show  its  disapproval  of  the 
authoritarian  regime,  it  continued  providing  light  weapons.  These  weapons  were  actually 
easier to use against internal opponents, and thus, the US policy did not shift the domestic 
balance of power significantly.28 Aid poured into the Greek military causing it  to become 
stronger and more autonomous.  
A  clear  indicator  of  the  salience  of  American  influence  in  keeping  the  military 
stronger than the rest of the society before and after the authoritarian regime was how the 
insurgent  colonels  took over  the government.  On the day of the coup,  only a handful  of 
middle-ranking officers used a NATO plan entitled Prometheus which was designed to be 
used  only  in  case  of  a  communist  takeover  or  war  with  a  communist  country.  The  plan 
sketched how communists and other suspects could be quickly arrested and how airfields, 
radio, and communications installations could be seized. No real mobilization of the military 
was necessary for the plan to work properly.  Enough tanks in Athens could take hold of 
crucial spots. Since Brigadier General Pattakos, among the three leaders of the junta, was in 
charge of armored training,  he provided all  the tanks  in  Athens  to  the insurgency.  Then, 
Lieutenant General Gregorios Spantidakes was convinced to announce to the army units all 
over Greece that the plan Prometheus was in force.29 Spantidakes was one of the chiefs of 
staff, and as a result, his pronouncement gave the image that the hierarchy of the military was 
26 Theodore A. Couloumbis, “The Greek Junta Phenomenon,” Polity, 6, 3 (1974), 353.
27 Danopoulos, Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, 28.
28 Goldbloom, “United States Policy in Post-War Greece,” 242.
29  C. L. Sulzberger, “Greece under the Colonels,” Foreign Affairs, 48, 2 (1970), 305. Also see Papandreou, 
Democracy at Gunpoint, 227-228.
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taking action. Because under Prometheus all military units knew what they were required to 
do, the insurgency succeeded in only a few hours. Indeed, the colonels only controlled tanks, 
the military police, and military schools in Athens.30 Without Prometheus, the mutiny might 
have never succeeded since the colonels would be obligated to mobilize other key military 
units. In order for each unit to know what they must do in advance, a bigger plan with more 
participants would have been necessary. However, the colonels did not enjoy overwhelming 
support within the military. Thus, there was a good chance for the mutiny to falter without 
Prometheus  and  without  NATO  training  which  made  the  plan  readily  available  to  the 
insurgents.
In summary, American military aid and assistance starting from the beginning of the 
Civil War and continuing during the authoritarian regime, kept the costs of intervening and 
sustaining military rule low for the colonels. The insurgents took over the government using a 
plan provided by NATO and the weapons Western powers granted since the Second World 
War. Such assistance and training was understandable in the Cold War context. However, aid 
went disproportionately to the armed forces, keeping the military autonomous and stronger 
than democratic forces. This imbalance decreased the costs of repression for the authoritarian 
rulers.
30 Athenian, Inside the Colonels’ Greece, translated by Richard Clogg (London: Chatto & Windus, 1972), 66.
12
Perceived Threat of Communism and  Benefits of Intervention:  
The second type of external influence was the Cold War context, which (coupled with 
Western military training and the legacy of the Civil War) caused the colonels and the right-
wing in Greece to perceive the Center Union as a leftist threat. This factor was not the only 
reason that caused the colonels to intervene;31 but it was one of the main motivations. At least, 
the communist threat became a justification for military rule and a rhetoric that the colonels 
used to legitimize their hold on power. 
After the Civil War, right-wing political parties and especially the National Radical 
Union (NRU) dominated Greek politics.  This situation changed in 1961 when a group of 
parties from moderate right to the socialists united under the banner of the Center Union party 
(CU), headed by Georgios Papandreou. In the 1961 elections, the party won 33.7 percent of 
the votes and became the main opposition party. Two years later,  the party gathered 42.1 
percent of the votes and won more seats in the parliament than the NRU. In 1964, more than 
half of the electorate chose the CU, effectively ending the superiority of the right-wing in 
Greek politics.32
Ideologically the CU was not an extreme leftist party. According to Papandreou, the 
primary goal of the party was to decrease the votes of the communist United Democratic Left 
(UDL) and participate in democracy with the other “nationally-minded” party, the National 
Radical Union.33 However, left-wing factions existed within the CU. For instance, among the 
parties that formed the CU, the Democratic Union of Elias Tsirimokos had its roots in the 
United Democratic Left and there were claims that 30 deputies were elected to the parliament 
31 Other factors were the split in the military between higher and lower ranking officers, the threat the military 
perceived against its own corporate interests, and the professional grievances of the colonels. Veremis, The 
Military in Greek Politics, 153-155.
32 John S. Koliopoulos and Thanos Veremis, Greece the Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Present (London: 
Hurst and Company, 2002), 100-101, George A. Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics 
(Boulder: East European Monographs, 1999), 68-69. For the electoral results, see Richard Clogg, Parties and 
Elections in Greece: The Search for Legitimacy (London: C. Hurst Company, 1987), 41, 45, 49, for more 
information on the NRU and CU, see Keith R. Legg, Politics in Modern Greece (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1969), 125-162.
33 Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, 39.
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with communist  support.34 Similarly,  some of  the  parties  that  made up the  Center  Union 
(including the Liberal Party) had previously cooperated with the United Democratic Left in an 
electoral coalition and won close to 49 percent of the votes in the 1956 elections.35 
The leftist faction within the Center Union gained strength especially after Georgios 
Papandreou’s son, Andreas, joined the party to serve in the 1964 government as a minister. 
Andreas Papandreou’s policies resembled the political objectives of the United Democratic 
Left, which acted as the representative of the Communist Party in exile. The UDL advocated 
the return of the Communist Party to Greece, separation of Greece from American sphere of 
influence, abandoning NATO membership, removal of foreign military bases in Greece, and 
the  abolition  of  certificates  of  anti-communism  for  employment  in  the  public  sector.36 
Andreas agreed with most of the demands of the UDL. He was especially vocal in criticizing 
Greece’s alliance with the USA and its  membership in NATO.  37 The right-wing military 
officers interpreted this rhetoric as communistic and fatal  for Greece’s membership to the 
Western  coalition.  Additionally,  Andreas  Papandreou’s  anti-NATO  and  anti-American 
policies jeopardized foreign budgetary support for the military by threatening to end Greece’s 
alliance that had benefited the armed forces in terms of aid, training, and equipment. 
Since the military in Greece, along with the monarchy, was seen as the bastion of 
right-wing against an internal communist threat, Andreas Papandreou’s direct attacks against 
the military were also interpreted as leftist challenges. First, Papandreou was accused of being 
involved  in  a  leftist  coup,  called  Aspida.  Andreas  repeatedly  refused  the  allegations.38 
However,  the conspiracy was uncovered by the intelligence  agency, and thus,  the regular 
officers in the military did not have enough information on the validity of the accusations. It is 
34 Clogg, Parties and Elections in Greece, 39, Christos L. Doumas, “Crisis, Revolution and Military Rule in 
Greece,” 262 ff 7.
35 D. George Kousoulas, “The Origins of the Greek Military Coup, April 1967” Orbis, 13,1 (1969), 336-337.
36 Ibid., 336, Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, 201-205.
37 Kousoulas, “The Origins of the Greek Military Coup,” 339-344. 
38 Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, 145-152, 187-194.
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safe to assume that some of them genuinely believed that Papandreou tried to stage a leftist 
coup using the military. 
Second, the Center Union called for the democratization of the armed forces, which 
meant the curtailment of the military’s prerogatives and especially its autonomy from civilian 
rule. Andreas Papandreou asserted that the military “will not be permitted to point its sword at 
the throat of Greek democracy” and declared that
the armed forces are made to serve the national interests…. When, as it will, the Center 
Union returns to power with wide popular support, it will limit the political role of the 
army… Military officers who dare to question the national character and purposes of 
the popularly elected government will have no future and no place in the Greek army. 
Officers of the Greek army will  not be allowed to engage in politics.  They will  be 
required to serve the public interests in a professional way under civilian control with 
overall policy.39 
Similarly,  the  CU demanded  to  abolish  the  right  of  the  military  to  vote  in  the  national 
elections. The votes of the military officers had favored the right-wing and had the power to 
determine who would win the elections. Thus, it was an important military prerogative and 
safeguard against the left, which the CU was insistent on eliminating.40 
Interviews conducted with 100 military officers from various ranks in the army during 
the winter of 1968 and 1969 by George Kourvetaris suggest that the coup-makers intervened 
and  the  interviewed  officers  supported  the  intervention  mainly  because  they  perceived  a 
communist  threat.  Respondents  argued  that  the  politicians  were  unable  put  down  and 
safeguard the country against the leftist danger because of their personal quarrels and their 
deficiency  to  comprehend  the  social  situation.  Several  reasons  were  given  to  justify  the 
subsistence of communist threat, most important ones being the policies of the Center Union 
39Danopoulos, Warriors and Politicians in Modern Greece, 53-54.
40 In 1963, the Center Union threatened to abstain if the military continued to exercise its right to vote in the 
national elections. Maurice Genevoix, The Greece of Karamanlis, trans. by Dorothy Trollope (London: Doric 
Publications, 1973), 171. In the November elections of the same year, the armed forces vote had been decisive in 
helping the National Radical Union receive only 2.7 percent of the votes less than the Center Union. 60.5 percent 
of the officers voted for the NRU as opposed to the 39.4 percent of the electorate. The Center Union received 
34.4 percent of the votes of the military and 42.1 percent of the civilians. See, Clogg, Parties and Elections in  
Greece, 46. It was a regularly used tactic to move military units to leftist oriented provinces before the elections 
in order to balance the results in favor of the right. See Legg, Politics in Modern Greece, 218-219.
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and Andreas Papandreou. The officers referred to the increasing number of demonstrations in 
support of the Center Union as repetition of the events leading to the Civil War of the 1940s. 
As one officer explained:
We fought the communists in Korea; we defeated them… in Greece. Yet I was stunned 
to see them again on the sidewalks of Athens. The national danger from communist 
subversion  was  seen  when Athens  was  transformed into  an  arena  of  mobocracy… 
[V]iolent  demonstrations  which had as  their  objective  chaos and the  destruction of 
Greece rather than the economic improvement of the working classes. The same events 
repeated as they had in the period of 1944 to 1949. We had no choice but to intervene.41
In a recent interview, one of the leading coup-makers, Stylianos Pattakos, reiterated that the 
communist  threat  and  the  dangers  that  emanated  from the  Center  Union  were  the  main 
reasons for their intervention.42
The question of whether there was a real communist threat or not prior to 1967 coup is 
still one of the most debated aspects of the 1967 coup. Given that the Center Union leadership 
was not communist, it does not seem that there was a real leftist threat. However, it must be 
acknowledged that the legacy of the Civil War and the external environment brought about 
exaggerated  claims  by  the  colonels  and  the  right-wing  that  the  CU  was  dangerous.  As 
Zaharopoulos argues, 
Such fears and beliefs were being daily reinforced by the right-wing press, sections of 
the which kept insisting virtually up until the outbreak of the April  coup, that Greece 
was on the threshold of another December (1944) uprising. Many officers –because of 
the civil war experience and their own deep anti-communist convictions- uncritically 
accepted these irresponsible press warnings. In other words, the threat of communism 
was perceived as salient. As is well known, perception of a threat is as potent a factor 
contributing to behavior as the actual existence of such a threat.43
In summary, the legacy of the Greek Civil War, which caused the armed forces to face 
leftist  insurgents after  the Axis occupation,  and the Cold War mentality,  which conceived 
communism as a great danger, resulted in the belief that Greece was about to face another 
leftist  insurgency. The calculations of the colonels changed, making them believe that the 
41 Kourvetaris, Studies on Modern Greek Society and Politics, 137-143, quote from 141.
42 Personal interview with the author, 03 September 2004, Athens.
43 George Zaharopoulos, “Politics and the Army in Post-War Greece,” in Greece under Military Rule, 29.
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benefits of intervention were higher than the costs. Years of military aid lowered the costs of 
suppressing the opposition and staging a coup. At the same time, establishing an authoritarian 
regime seemed beneficial since it would “clean” the political system from the leftists.
International Influence on the Costs of Authoritarianism in Turkey
International influences during and after the Second World War triggered a transition 
to  democracy  in  Turkey.  The  Republican  People’s  Party  (RPP)  was  in  power  after  the 
collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the declaration of the Republic in 1923. The transition to 
democracy started in 1946 when an opposition party, the Democratic Party, was established. 
The same year the first direct national elections were held. The RPP won the 1946 elections 
but the Democrats also gained seats in the parliament. The rule of the RPP ended with the 
1950 elections, which brought to power the Democrats.
External factors contributed to this transition by altering the cost – benefit analysis of 
the top leadership of the Republican People’s Party (RPP). First, war-time difficulties and 
policies of the RPP caused the alliance that sustained the regime to crumble, and thereby, 
increased the costs of maintaining single-party rule. During the 1930s, the landed elites and 
the  business  community  supported  authoritarianism because  the  RPP  sustained  economic 
stability, provided a fruitful business environment, and protected private property. However, 
in the 1940s, this changed: the well-being and security of the economic elites were under 
attack due to unfavorable policies enacted during the Second World War. The preferences of 
the military also changed. Whereas during the initial years of the Republic, the military was 
unified and supportive of the RPP, in the 1940s, the military was split and the lower ranking 
officers were in opposition to the party in government. The mutinies in the military left the 
government  weak  and  in  no  position  to  successfully  repress  the  opposition.  The  second 
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influence of international factors was to persuade the top leadership of RPP and especially 
president Ismet Inonu that transition to democracy was necessary to secure Turkey’s alliance 
with the West. According to Inonu, the collapse of fascist regimes in Europe after the war and 
the threat the Soviet Union posed to Turkey required the end of single-party rule in Turkey. 
Thus, the costs of authoritarianism increased not only due to war-time policies of the RPP but 
also  due  to  the  external  context.  The  following  pages  will  examine  these  effects  of  the 
international factors respectively.
Policies during the Second World War and Increasing Costs
Even though Turkey did not enter the Second World War, the policies of the RPP 
during the war were the main reason for the breaking up of the RPP-economic elite alliance. 
The first war-time economic policy of the government was the law of national defense, which 
increased the control of the state on economic activities. In addition to the provisions that 
created  grievances  among  the  lower  classes  (see  below),  the  law  also  threatened  the 
businessmen by permitting the state to arrange production and allowing it to confiscate private 
enterprises.44 
Despite this potential danger, however, until 1942, the government did not disturb the 
activities of the business community. On the contrary, it spurred commercial activities. The 
economic policy of the state was aimed at supplying necessary substances to the big cities and 
to the mobilized military. For this purpose, the state bought agricultural products at cheap 
prices and rationed some of them (such as bread) in the cities, while sold others (such as 
cotton) at market prices to generate revenue for the military. But such controls proved to be 
difficult: as the state could not manage rationing properly, it intensified war-time scarcity and 
44 For the economic policies of the Turkish state during the Second World War, see Korkut Boratav, Turkiye’de  
Devletcilik (Ankara: Savas Yayinlari, 1982), 215-268 and for other policies, see Osman Akandere, Milli Sef  
Donemi: Cok Partili Hayata Geciste Rol Oynayan Ic ve Dis Tesirler: 1938-1945 (Istanbul: Iz Yayincilik, 1998), 
145-268.
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caused on average 250 percent inflation.45 Since individuals were allowed to continue buying 
and selling the same products the state attempted to control, the result was the creation of a 
huge black-market  and the accumulation  of wealth  by merchants  who could stock scarce 
produce.  Business  flourished  at  record  rate:  for  instance,  during  the  war,  1,982  new 
companies were registered to the Istanbul Chamber of Commerce and, in Izmir, the number of 
big enterprises increased from 9 to 41.46
Because the tax system was ineffective in transferring the profits of these merchants to 
the state, the government decided to initiate a one-time-only wealth levy. Even though the 
levy  was  supposed  to  be  applied  to  the  business  community  in  general,  in  practice,  the 
Christian and Jewish minorities of Istanbul were the ones heavily taxed. 2,057 businessmen 
were taken into camps because they could not pay their obligations. More than half of these 
were sent to the east for forced labor and 21 died there.47 In addition, in 1944, the state used 
the law on national defense to confiscate the machineries of some of the factories in Istanbul 
and Eskisehir.48 Even though the wealth levy did not affect the Muslim bourgeoisie and the 
confiscations were not widespread, they demonstrated to the businessmen that their alliance 
with the state was not solid and that the RPP politicians could threaten their well-being and 
security. 
The  business  community  was  not  the  only  elite  group  that  reached  the  same 
conclusion at the end of the war: the landowning elite, too, was threatened by the policies of 
the state. In 1944, the government initiated the ten percent agricultural produce tax in order to 
increase revenue for war mobilization, and in June 1945, it enacted the land reform law in 
45 For inflation rates on basic commodities, see Cetin Yetkin, Turkiye’de Tek Parti Yonetimi 1930-1945, 
(Istanbul: Altin Kitaplar Yayinevi, 1983), 183-184.
46 Taner Timur, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Hayata Gecis, (Ankara: Imge Kitapevi, 2003), 26 ff 6 and Kemal Karpat, 
Turkey’s Politics: The Transition to a Multi-party System (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), 93 ff 33.
47 The best resource on the wealth levy is the accounts of the officer in charge of the collection of the tax, Faik 
Okte, Varlik Vergisi Faciasi (Istanbul: Nebioglu Yayinevi, 1951). For a summary, see Karpat, Turkey’s Politics,  
114-117.
48 Yetkin, Turkiye’de Tek Parti Yonetimi, 186-188.
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order  to  satisfy  the  antagonistic  peasants  (see  below).49 The  latter  law  meant  the  total 
elimination of the landowning class because it envisioned distributing lands larger than 500 
hectares (or if that is not sufficient larger than 200 hectares) to landless peasants or peasants 
who  lacked  sufficient  land.  The  notorious  article  17  of  the  law  stated  that,  in  densely 
populated areas, lands equal or less than 20 hectares would be nationalized and the minimum 
land a peasant could hold would be 5 hectares.50 
The  landlords  in  the  parliament  fiercely  opposed  the  new  law.  Following  their 
dissent,  Celal  Bayar  (the  ex-prime  minister  close  to  the  business  community),  Adnan 
Menderes (a large landowner), Fuad Koprulu, and Refik Koraltan submitted a proposal that 
demanded the liberalization of the regime. Five months later, the latter three were expelled 
and Bayar resigned from the party. On 7 January 1946, the four formed the Democratic Party 
(DP) with the direct participation of the landowners and financial support from the business 
elites.51 In  January  1947,  a  group  of  merchants  from  Istanbul  founded  the  Istanbul 
Commercial Association despite the opposition of the state-controlled Istanbul Chamber of 
Commerce.  Even  though,  according  to  the  law  in  force,  professional  associations  were 
prohibited, the new association started to publish an economic journal and held an economic 
congress.  In  its  publications  and  other  activities,  the  association  gave  support  to  the 
Democratic  Party  and  criticized  the  policies  of  the  RPP.52 Similarly,  among  the  250 
candidates of the DP in the 1946 elections, 41 were landowners and 39 were businessmen.53
The  opposition  the  RPP  faced  from  the  economic  elites  increased  the  costs  of 
sustaining  the regime.  During the 1920s and 1930s,  the military  was the main repressive 
organ of the state. Such military cooperation was again needed if the RPP decided to suppress 
49 For other reasons behind the land reform law, see Asim Karaomerlioglu, Orada Bir Koy Var Uzakta: Erken  
Cumhuriyet Doneminde Koycu Soylem (Istanbul: Iletisim Yayincilik, 2006), 117-143.
50 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 117-125. For more on this issue, see Resat Aktan, “Problems of Land Reform in 
Turkey,” The Middle East Journal, 20, 3 (1966), 317-334.
51 For an account of these events, see Timur, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Hayata Gecis, 14-21. For the involvement of 
the landlords and the businessmen, see Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 316-317 ff 28.
52 Timur, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Hayata Gecis, 130-133.
53 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 163-165.
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the Democratic Party. However, in the 1940s, the Second World War also caused grievances 
among  the  military  officers.  First,  the  military  mobilization  for  the  war  revealed  the 
backwardness of the Turkish army. Military equipment was old and necessary supplies were 
insufficient,  causing  soldiers  to  starve  and  to  get  transferred  within  the  country  without 
motorized vehicles (and even barefoot). Second, the lower ranking officers complained about 
their promotion possibilities. The hierarchy of the military was kept so much intact that the 
members of the board of high commanders chosen for the Second World War were the same 
generals  who fought  the War of Independence after  the First  World War.  Worsening the 
situation still, a number of laws were enacted in the 1940s, which made it possible for high 
ranking officers to continue their services in the military while lengthening the promotions of 
the lower ranking soldiers. Accordingly, even though some of the commanders and the Chief 
of the General Staff Fevzi Cakmak were retired after 22 years, their subsequent replacements 
were about the same age and seniority. Mobilization for the Second World War revealed these 
handicaps of the armed forces, causing resentments.
Finally, the autonomy and powers of the armed forces were curtailed partly in order 
to centralize  the decision-making during the war and direct  the military’s  attention to the 
external threat.  In 1940, the authority to execute the decisions of the martial law commanders 
was transferred from the military to the police forces. In 1944, the office of the chief of staff 
became responsible to the prime minister and in 1949, it was subordinated to the ministry of 
national defense. The important functions of the chief of staff (such as military appointments, 
maneuvers,  and  education)  were  either  relegated  to  the  ministry  or  came  under  its 
supervision.54 These policies  did not  just  affect  the lower ranking officers,  but  the whole 
military as an institution.
54 See for the military related policies of this period, Umit Ozdag, Ordu-Siyaset Iliskisi (Ataturk ve Inonu 
Donemleri) (Ankara: Gundogan Yayinlari, 1991), 125-169, George S. Harris, “The Role of the Military in 
Turkish Politics (Part I)” Middle East Journal, 19, 1 (1965), 62-63, 65. 
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As a result of these developments, secret organizations started to form among the 
lower ranking officers. During the Second World War, the main aim of the organizations was 
to fight against the promotional bottleneck in the Turkish armed forces. After the war and 
with the creation of the Democratic Party, these organizations changed their aspirations and 
started to support the new party.  Their  leaders met with opposition politicians,  Bayar and 
Menderes, and decided to intervene if the RPP refused to step down after the 1950 elections. 
On the other hand, President Ismet Inonu was aware of the secret organizations and managed 
to get insurance from a few higher ranking officers that  if he wished,  the military would 
intervene  against  the  Democratic  Party.  In  response,  the  DP got  the  word  from its  own 
supporters that the military was not under the control of the RPP.55 As George Harris notes, 
“this behind-the-scenes maneuvering…. stimulated the political consciousness of the officer 
corps.” Marking this politicization, influential officers (such as the ex-Chief of Staff Fevzi 
Cakmak, Lt. General Fahri Belen, Colonel Seyfi Kurtbek, and ex-general Ali Fuat Cebesoy) 
joined the ranks of the DP.56 Thus, the RPP lost the unanimous support of the armed forces 
during the Second World War. This increased the costs of repression since the Republicans 
relied on the military to repress rebellions in the past.
Another factor that increased the costs was the way war-time difficulties affected the 
peasants and the working class. Indeed, the Democrats had good chances of coming to power 
after 1946 especially due to increasing grievances of the majority of the peasants against the 
Republican People’s Party government. The dissatisfaction stemmed partly from the policies 
of the state during the Second World War. Shortly before the start of the war, the government 
established  the Office  of  Soil  Products  with  the purpose of  granting  price  support  to  the 
55 For more information on the secret organizations, see the following memoirs: Fahri Belen, Ordu ve Politika:  
Ordu Ihtilalleri, Askeri Diktatorlukler, Anarsinin Kaynaklari, Bolucu Hareketler (Istanbul: Bakis Matbaasi, 
1971), 32-33, Sadi Kocas, Ataturk’ten 12 Mart’a Anilar, first volume (Istanbul: Dogus Matbaasi, 1977), 
147-159, for summaries, see Abdi Ipekci and Omer Sami Cosar, Ihtilalin Ic Yuzu (Istanbul: Uygun Yayinevi, 
1965), 11-24, Yetkin, Karsidevrim, 595-606, and Ozdag, Ordu-Siyaset Iliskisi, 141-144, 164-168.
56 Harris, “The Role of the Military,” 64-65. In 1948, Fevzi Cakmak resigned from the DP and formed his own 
party.
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peasants and distributing agricultural produce to the military and the geographical regions that 
needed it. During the Second World War, the Office collected agricultural outputs to supply 
the mobilized military. The state paid prices below the market for the crops it accumulated 
from the peasants in order to keep the costs of bread low in the cities. This policy worked to 
the detriment of the rural population, who had difficulties making ends meet.57 The working 
class in the cities, on the other hand, was adversely affected by the law of national defense, 
which stipulated that citizens could be forced to work in factories to increase production. 
Similarly, the RPP government had the right to increase work hours and days in order to cope 
with the requirements  of war preparation.  The peasants,  as  well,  were forced to work on 
agricultural  estates and hand their  farm animals to the state.58 These provisions turned the 
peasants and workers against the RPP.59 Thus, the policies of the single-party government to 
cope with war-time difficulties increased grievances among the majority of the population, 
leading to augmented costs in sustaining the authoritarian regime.
While  the war increased the costs,  the benefits  of keeping an authoritarian  regime 
started  to  decline  due  to  several  domestic  factors.  First,  the  Democratic  Party  was  not 
perceived as revolutionary. The Republicans had established an authoritarian regime in the 
1930s partially because their secularist reforms were not welcomed by the majority of the 
electorate. Trials with democracy in the 1920s resulted in the resurgence of religious activities 
and threats against the reforms of the Republicans. However, in the 1940s, these reasons for 
sustaining  an  authoritarian  regime  were  perceived  as  declining.  When  the  DP  was  first 
established, hardliner deputies led by Prime Minister Recep Peker argued that the new party 
was planning a revolution that would reverse the Kemalist reforms. However, in 1947, the 
Democrats signed and accepted a text prepared by President Ismet Inonu, 60 which guaranteed 
57 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 102-104.
58 Boratav, Turkiye’de Devletcilik, 248-255.
59 Cem Erogul, Demokrat Parti: Tarihi ve Ideolojisi, (Ankara: Imge Kitapevi Yayinlari, 2003), 18.
60 Samet Agaoglu, Siyasi Gunluk: Demokrat Parti’nin Kurulusu, prepared by Cemil Kocak (Istanbul: Iletisim 
Yayinlari, 1992), 430.
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that the new party would not overturn the reforms. Since the leaders of the DP were well-
known  politicians  during  the  authoritarian  regime,  these  assurances  were  perceived  as 
genuine.61 Inonu presented a speech on 12 July 1947 which declared to the public that the DP 
was not a revolutionary party. This speech marked the end of the RPP’s policy to suppress the 
DP, and allowed the party to win the elections and takeover the government in 1950. 
The second domestic factor that decreased the benefits of sustaining an authoritarian 
regime  was  the  conviction  of  the  Republicans  that  they  could  win  the  elections  under  a 
democratic  system.  The  RPP  leadership  thought  that  the  Kemalist  reforms  were  now 
increasingly accepted by the electorate. Since the Democrats were not expected to change the 
reforms either, the RPP leaders believed that the chances for them to come to power again 
were good. In fact, the RPP did not expect the DP to be so successful in such a short period of 
time. According to one of the leaders of the Democratic Party, Adnan Menderes, “apparently, 
the reason for the soft and tolerant behavior of the People’s Party during the first years of the 
DP’s establishment, was because of the conviction that the party would not be able to settle, 
develop, and strengthen itself vis-à-vis the government and the party in power.”62 The RPP 
believed that it could win the elections by regaining the support of the groups it lost. In order 
to appease the business community, the RPP liberalized trade, devalued the Turkish lira, lifted 
the restrictions of the sale of gold, and changed the definition of étatism in the party program 
so that it became more liberal and pro-business.63 To the satisfaction of the landowners, the 
state refrained from implementing the land reform law, distributing only 3,600 hectares of 
land and abolishing the most radical provisions of the law in 1950.64 The RPP attempted to 
gain  the  support  of  the  conservative  peasants  by  softening  its  secularist  stance,  such  as 
introducing religious education and adding to the party program the provision that the state 
61 Mustafa Albayrak, Turk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti (1946-1960) (Ankara: Phoenix Yayinevi, 2004), 
178-179. Albayrak notes that during the 1950 elections, the DP safeguarded the Kemalist reforms and 
demonstrated that it was not revolutionary.
62 Erogul, Demokrat Parti, 88 ff 3.
63 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics,  172-174, 302-303, Timur, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Hayata Gecis,  80-81.
64 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 124.
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cold not interfere in people’s religious beliefs.65 Such changes in policies reflect the belief that 
with minor gestures the RPP elites thought that they can retain their power. 
Beginning of the Cold War and External Costs:
Turkey did not enter the Second World War and tried to keep its neutrality from the 
Axis and Allied powers. However, fearful of Germany’s presence in Greece and neighboring 
Balkan  states,  Turkey  also  tried  to  appease  the  Axis  powers.  For  this  purpose,  Turkey 
continued to sell chromite,  which was an important raw material  in German war industry. 
Turkey also allowed German military ships, covered up as commercial carriers, to use the 
straits. These policies of the Turkish government intimidated and created discontent in the 
USA and Britain.66 Both Roosevelt and Churchill demanded Turkey to cut its relations with 
Germany and declare war against the Axis powers. Under pressure, Turkey first ceased its 
chromite sales in April 1944, and then cuts its diplomatic relations with Germany in August 
1944.  This was followed by Turkey’s decision to sever its connections with Japan in January 
1945.   Finally,  towards  the  end of  the  Second World  War,  Turkey declared  war  against 
Germany, with the hopes of getting invited to the conference that would mark the beginning 
of the United Nations. This minor goal was achieved when Turkey joined the Allied powers 
in San Francisco in 1945. However, these gestures came too late and Turkey’s neutral policy 
towards Germany isolated the country from the USA and Britain at the end of the war.67
This  isolation  became  a  problem  especially  because  the  Soviet  Union  started  to 
threaten Turkey.  Already at the beginning of the Second World War, Moscow had demanded 
Turkey to  allow the  USSR to  build  bases  in  the  straits  that  connected  Black  Sea  to  the 
Aegean.  This  request  was  rejected  by  the  Turkish  government  since  it  contradicted  the 
Montreux Convention which recognized Turkish sovereignty over the straits. However, the 
65 Timur, Turkiye’de Cok Partili Hayata Gecis, 82, Yetkin, Karsidevrim, 441-459.
66 Karaosmanoglu, “The International Context of Democratic Transition in Turkey,” 161.
67 Albayrak, Turk Siyasi Tarihinde Demokrat Parti, 35-37.
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same issue was raised again in the Tahran, Yalta, and Postam Conferences. Since both Britain 
and the USA wanted the straits to be used only for Allied purposes, they seemed to agree with 
the Russian claims during the Second World War. In March 1945, Moscow added another 
request and made territorial  claims on three cities  in eastern Turkey -Kars,  Ardahan, and 
Artvin. Even though the USA and Britain started to oppose Soviet demands after the end of 
the war, the Turkish government still felt an immediate external threat from Moscow.68 
This external threat at the beginning of the Cold War required Turkey to be part of the 
Western alliance. Turkey needed American aid not only for economic development, but also 
to supply and train the military against a possible Soviet attack. As noted above, mobilization 
for the Second World War had proven the weaknesses of the Turkish military against  an 
external aggressor. As a result, Turkey wanted to become part of the United Nations, NATO, 
and the Council of Europe. However, given Turkey’s neutral position during the war, it was 
not clear until  1947 if Turkey would be accepted to these international organizations as a 
Western  ally.  For  the  top  leadership  of  the  Republican  People’s  Party,  it  seemed  that 
sustaining the single-party regime in this context was costly. It was believed that liberalization 
of the authoritarian regime would play in Turkey’s favor and convince the Western powers 
that Turkey belonged to the democratic camp against the threat communist regimes posed.
It must be noted that this reasoning alone could not have pushed Turkey to change 
its regime. First, in the subsequent years of the Cold War, it became clear that it was not 
necessary to be a democratic regime in order to be a Western ally. There were no consistent 
and long-run international sanctions against authoritarian regimes. As the Greek authoritarian 
regime of 1967 clearly shows, the United States did not refrain from allying with authoritarian 
regimes  against  the  threat  of  communism  and  Soviet  aggression.  Similarly,  for  NATO 
membership, being a democracy was not a precondition. Otherwise, the authoritarian regime 
68 Ibid., 37-42, Erogul, Demokrat Parti, 19-20.
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of  Portugal  could  not  have  become a  founding member.  In  fact,  there  is  no  evidence  to 
suggest that there was any diplomatic pressure on Turkey to democratize. 
Second, even though the 1946 multi-party elections might have been necessary for 
convincing the West that Turkey is on the same camp, there was no such need when the actual 
transition  took place.  By 1950,  when the opposition Democratic  Party  won the elections, 
Turkey was already a member of the UN, and the US President, Harry Truman, had already 
delivered his famous speech which promised military and economic aid to Turkey. 
Finally, the birth of the Democratic Party and its rise to power against the Republican 
People’s  Party  were  hard-won  achievements.  There  was  resistance  from  the  Republican 
People’s Party, and the Democratic Party ensured victory only via domestic pressure. Most of 
the Republican People’s Party deputies and the state bureaucracy were hostile towards the 
new party. In 1946, national elections were held and the newly established party won 66 out 
of 465 parliamentary seats. However, the leaders of the Democratic Party and the press did 
not accept the outcome and accused the government of having tampered with the results. The 
Democrats won the elections in 1950 only with consistent pressure, assurances that Kemalist 
reforms would not be reversed, and threats of mass mobilization. If international pressure was 
the only reason, the Democratic Party would not have to fight for its rights and the Republican 
People’s Party would not try to prevent the Democratic Party’s rise to power.
Keeping in mind these reservations, the role of the international context in the cost-
benefit  analysis  of  the  Republican  People’s  Party  leadership  must  still  be  acknowledged. 
International influences after the Second World War played a legitimizing role. The collapse 
of the fascist regimes after the war and the Turkish foreign policy of allying with the West 
legitimized  the  demands  and  strengthened  the  hands  of  the  Turkish  elites  who  favored 
democracy. 
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President Inonu, who is usually seen as the architect of Turkish democracy, justified 
the first direct elections of the republic and the participation of the Democratic Party to these 
elections,  by  the  Soviet  threat  on  Turkish  soil.  In  numerous  speeches  before  the  1946 
elections, Inonu argued that the Soviet threat can be thwarted and allies can be made only if, 
with direct elections, the nation proves itself as unified. Inonu explained his decision to allow 
multi-party  politics  by  the  necessity  to  demonstrate  to  foes  and  allies  that  the  Turkish 
government’s foreign policy was supported by the whole nation. According to Inonu, only 
free  elections  could  show that  the  government  genuinely  had  the  support  of  the  Turkish 
people. President Inonu implied that even if the Democrats won the elections, they would 
seek Western alliance against the communist block, and therefore, prove that the nation was 
unified around this core foreign policy. In one typical speech, Inonu defended the decision to 
hold competitive elections in 1946 as follows:
We decided  on  the  new national  elections  in  order  to  determine  the  domestic  and 
foreign … policies of the country. It seems that the world has entered into a long period 
of  uncertainty  and  darkness.   In  this  epoch,  the  direction  of  Turkish  politics  must 
become internally and externally perceptible.… Under some circumstances, the official 
declarations of statesmen are not enough to reveal the policies of the nation. In these 
situations, the nation must firmly ensure its stand by openly demonstrating its own will. 
The national elections will give us this result… Only the opinion that is revealed by 
[the national elections] will demonstrate to the world that our country is on the right 
path and in a strong condition.69 
As this  quotation  exemplifies,  the  leadership  of  the  RPP tied  Turkish  democratization  to 
international influences after the Second World War and used it as a legitimizing factor for 
the transition of the regime.70
Similarly,  the  opposition  used  the  international  context  to  strengthen it  hands  and 
facilitate a transition to democracy. On 24 February 1945 Turkey signed the United Nations 
Declaration, which included liberal and democratic principles. Following this development, 
69 This speech was delivered in Aksehir on 6 May 1946. Ismet Inonu: Konusma, Demec, Makale, Mesaj ve 
Soylesiler 1944-1950, hazirlayan Ilhan Turan (Ankara: TBMM Kultur, Sanat ve Yayin Kurulu Yayinlari No:99, 
2003), 72.
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Ismet Inonu promised that “as the conditions imposed by war disappear, democratic principles 
will gradually acquire a larger place in the political and cultural life of the country.”71 During 
the ratification of the UN Charter in the Turkish Parliament, one of the future leaders of the 
Democratic Party, Adnan Menderes, argued that the democratic principles of the Charter were 
not yet fulfilled in Turkey. Menderes requested the elimination of restrictive features of the 
single-party rule. The newspapers picked up on this issue and “the demand to conform to the 
United Nations Charter soon became the main theme of the press.”72 The Democrats  split 
from the RPP and facilitated a transition to democracy in this domestic context. Even though 
the UN Charter was not the primary cause of democratization, its approval by the government 
“provided the dissidents with legal and moral arguments against the one-party system and 
encouraged them to bring their opposition into the open and to seek popular support.”73
In summary, international influences in the 1940s changed the cost-benefit analysis of 
the Republican People’s Party, like they did in Greece. Policies that the government enacted 
during  the  Second World  War  resulted  in  increasing  antagonism against  the  single-party 
regime. This growing opposition was evident among the economic elites, peasants, working 
class,  and  the  military.  Loss  of  domestic  support  increased  the  costs  of  sustaining  the 
authoritarian regime. At the same time, the international context was changing towards the 
Cold War. Soviet threats required Turkey to become part of the Western alliance. However, 
neutrality during the war had distanced Turkey from the USA and Britain. Turkey signed the 
UN  Charter  and  started  to  actively  seek  cooperation  against  the  USSR.  This  policy 
commitment legitimized the demands of the domestic opposition and pro-democratic forces. 
At the start of the Cold War, sustaining the authoritarian regime would have been costly for 
Turkey’s alliance with the West and American assistance. At the same time the benefits of 
71 Karpat, Turkey’s Politics, 141.
72 Ibid., 142.
73 Ibid., 143.
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authoritarianism declined  due  to  domestic  reasons.  Since  the  costs  started  to  exceed  the 
benefits, there was a transition to democracy in Turkey. 
Conclusions from the Greek and Turkish Regime Transitions in the Cold War
Today’s international context is very different than the Aegean regime transitions at 
the beginning of the Cold War years. Both Greek and Turkish domestic politics were affected 
by the Second World War.  In Greece, Axis occupation and the consequent ascendancy of the 
communists led to a costly Civil War. The war heightened anti-communist perceptions and 
exaggerated the dangers associated with leftism. In Turkey, the policies of the single-party 
government  to  cope  with  war-time  mobilization  and  economic  difficulties  brought  about 
discontent  among  the  population.  Soviet  threats  to  Turkish  sovereignty  produced  similar 
results as in Greece and intensified fears of communism. These conditions that Greece and 
Turkey faced were unique to the aftermath of the Second World War. It is highly unlikely that 
the same circumstances will repeat themselves. 
However,  it  is  still  possible  to  draw some  important  lessons  from the  Greek  and 
Turkish transitions in the 1950s and 1960s. First, the Greek case highlights the importance of 
domestic  recipients  of  American  aid  and  assistance.  The  Hellenic  Armed  Forces  were 
influenced by American support more than other societal groups. According to Charles Tilly, 
contrary to European cases,  in Third World societies  authoritarian leaders do not need to 
bargain with elites in order to wage wars.  Instead, they seek foreign aid, which adversely 
affects the power balance among societal groups. According to Tilly,
the creation of a bipolar,  then tripolar  world system of states since World War II 
intensified the competition among great  powers for  the allegiance of Third World 
states, and the tendency to leave no part of the Third World neutral. That competition 
induced  the  great  powers,  especially  the  United  States  and  the  Soviet  Union,  to 
provide arms, military training, and military advice to many states. In return, the great 
powers, or major interests within them, received commodities such as oil, political 
support in the world arena and, sometimes, profits from the sale of arms. In those 
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states,  military  organizations  grew  in  size,  strength,  and  efficacy  while  other 
organizations stood still or withered. 74
Similar  to  the  Third World,  the strategic  location  of  Greece  increased  its  importance  for 
American interests during the Cold War years. Even though the USA did not directly stage an 
intervention, military aid had important implications in keeping the armed forces strong, and 
as  a  result,  lowering  the  costs  of  repression  in  an  authoritarian  regime.  As  a  result,  the 
colonels  intervened and sustained their  regime with foreign aid despite  the fact  that  their 
regime was disdained by the majority of the Greeks. Thus, one conclusion that can be drawn 
from this finding is that, as many scholars have also argued,75 Western assistance and training 
must be more balanced among different societal forces, including the military, civil society 
organizations,  trade  unions,  political  parties,  and other  pro-democratic  forces.  Unbalanced 
assistance can result in unforeseen and unintentional consequences in domestic politics even 
when aid was provided only to enhance the recipient’s external security.  
While the Greek case draws attention to foreign aid, the Turkish experience highlights 
the importance of ideational factors. The existence of a Western democratic coalition was 
used  as  a  legitimizing  factor  among  the  Republican  People’s  Party  leadership  and  the 
members  of  the  Democratic  Party.  However,  the  presence  of  a  Western  alliance  did  not 
influence Turkish politics only because its members were democratic nations. Without the 
formation of a domestic opposition that could capitalize on the international context, the UN 
Charter could not have the influence it did. In addition, it must not be forgotten that the threat 
Turkey faced from the Soviet Union was a major security concern. Ideational influences came 
into the picture when and because they were combined with  realpolitik concerns. Thus, in 
74 Charles Tilly, Coercion, Capital and European States: AD 990-1992 (Cambridge, MA and Oxford: Blackwell, 
1992), 220. See also Lisa Anderson, “The State in the Middle East and North Africa,” Comparative Politics 20, 
1 (1987), 1-18.
75 On democracy promotion, see for instance Thomas Carothers, Aiding Democracy Abroad: The Learning 
Curve (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999) and the volume edited by Peter 
Burnell, Democracy Assistance: International Co-operation for Democratization (London and Portland, OR: 
Frank Cass, 2000).
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today’s world as well, frequent references to the coalition of democratic forces on their own 
might not lead to the liberalization of authoritarian regimes. The likelihood that this type of 
discourse has an effect on regime transition increases when it is coupled with credible threats 
from an un-democratic nation, against which the democratic nations provide security. 
Similar  ideological  influences  emanating  from the  Cold  War  international  context 
were also evident in Greece. Communism was perceived as a threat and became an important 
tool in the hands of the colonels. However, ironically, while anti-communism led Greece to 
authoritarianism,  it  brought  about  a  democratic  transition  in  Turkey.  There were multiple 
reasons for this divergence. First, in Greece in the 1960s, the communist threat was perceived 
as  coming  from  domestic  actors,  such  as  the  Center  Union.  This  domestic  danger  was 
exaggerated with the experience of Civil War, which brought the right-wing forces face-to-
face with the communists. In Turkey of the 1940s, on the other hand, there was yet no major 
leftist movement in domestic politics. The communist danger was mostly external and came 
from the Soviet Union. Indeed, when leftist movements increased their force in the 1960s and 
1970s, the Turkish military intervened in democracy, similar to the Greek colonels (albeit for 
a shorter period of time). 
The second reason why the Cold War ideological environment led to two different 
results in Greece and Turkey was diverging power balances between domestic societal forces. 
As it has already been discussed above, the Greek military increased its power substantially in 
the aftermath of the Second World War due partially to foreign aid. This resulted in lower 
costs of suppression for the colonels. In contrast,  the leaders of the single-party regime in 
Turkey lost power. Sustaining the regime and continuing to repress the opposition became 
costly because war-time difficulties caused the economic elites, peasants, and sections of the 
military to turn against the Republican People’s Party.  Thus, the role that the international 
context plays and whether or not democratic currants will lead to liberalization also depend on 
32
the makeup of the domestic forces, their regime preferences, and relative power balance.  This 
is why, as mentioned above, it is important to promote democracy by providing assistance to 
the pro-democratic forces in the recipient country. 
The Greek and Turkish regime transitions demonstrate  that  international  influences 
will have an effect on democratic transitions when two external factors are combined: first, 
even distribution  of aid in  the recipient  country without  necessarily  ignoring the strategic 
interests  of  the Western powers,  and second,  the  presence  of  an international  democratic 
coalition that could provide security to the nation from external threats. 
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